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SHOULD THE INSANITY DEFENSE BE ABOLISHED?*
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATE
Professor Norval Morris** vs. Professor Richard Bonnie**
Introduction by Professor Joel J. Finer****
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
In the spring of 1984 I proposed that the law school initiate a Great
Debate series on topics of interest to the law school, the outside legal
community and law-concerned members of the public.1 The idea of the
debate probably in part resulted from the "vividness effect" of the
Hinckley verdict. 2 Not only were politicians calling for drastic reforms
or abolition of the insanity defense, 3 but prestigious professional
organizations4 and study groups 5 were committing their time and talents
to rethinking the notion that an actor's mental illness should have
significance for the nature of the legally imposed consequences of harming an interest protected by the criminal law.6
Two of the leading figures in the renewed national debate over the
insanity defense were Professor Richard Bonnie of the University of
* This debate took place in the two-tiered Moot Court auditorium on the evening
of April 11, 1985, to an audience that at times was standing room only. With the postdebate questioning period, the speakers gave of themselves, on stage for almost two hours.
** Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology and former Dean, University
of Chicago Law School; LL.B. 1946, LL.M. 1947, University of Melbourne; Ph.D. 1949,
London University; LL.D. 1978, Villanova; LL.D. 1982, William Mitchell University.
*** Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public
Policy, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A. 1966, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B.
1969, University of Virginia.
**** B.B.A., City College of New York; M.A., LL.B., Yale University; Professor
of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1 The proposal became reality, supported by a grant from the Cleveland-Marshall
Fund and by the enthusiastic approval of Dean Robert Bogomolny.
2 The "vividness effect" is the statistically undue prominence given to the
characteristics of a particular instance of a regularly occurring phenomena because of
the concreteness and immediacy of the present example. See Rosenhan, Psychological
Realities and Judicial Policy, 19 STAN. LAW. 10 (1984). Cf. Myths and Realities, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983).
3See, e.g., Wall St. J., June 23, 1982, at 7, Hinckley's Acquittal Spurs Calls to Curb
Insanity Defense; Senate Might Act Soon.
4E.g., the American Psychiatric Association, the American Medical Association,
the American Bar Association. The American Bar Association had begun its project,
"Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards," prior to the Hinckley verdict but that verdict played "a substantial role in shaping the ultimate content of the ABA's standards."
Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, in Symposium on the CriminalJustice Mental
Health Standards, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 529 (1985).
1 E.g., the National Commission on the Insanity Defense of the National Mental
Health Association, which produced the report Myths and Realities (1983).
1See Bayer, The Insanity Defense in Retreat, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13 (1983);
Applebaum, The Insanity Defense: New Calls for Reform, 33 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY (1982).
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Virginia School of Law, and Professor (former Dean) Norval Morris of
the University of Chicago School of Law. Professor Bonnie drafted the
formulation adopted in the proposal of the American Psychiatric
Association 7 designed to retain the defense of those defendants whose
acts, given the defined mental state (severely impaired reality testing)
seemed most morally deserving of exculpation. 8 He also contributed
significantly 9 to Congress' promulgation of a new federal insanity
defenseo and to the American Bar Association's proposal on this subject." Professor Morris' ideas about the defense, 12 which had provoked
considerable discussion in the literature of the law,1 3 also found their
7American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983).
8 For the basis of the

thesis, see Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1983, at 194. It is also found in the APA Report, (explicitly adopting
Professor Bonnie's recommendations) supra note 7, at 685.
The APA's recommendation is that the insanity defense be retained primarily because
of its moral significance; that the test for insanity be an exclusively cognitive one (the
defendant must have been unable, because of mental disease or retardation, "to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense." Id. at 685. In the recommendation, mental disease is defined as including "only those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception and understanding
of reality and that are not attributable to the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or other
psychoactive substances." Id. Regarding violent insanity acquitees, it is recommended
that a special disposition system be set up to protect the public. Id. at 686-87.
See also other publications by Richard Bonnie: Bonnie, Book Review, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1984, at 100 (reviewing L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE ON THE TRIAL OF JOHN
W. HINCKLEY (1984)); Morality, Equality and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship
Between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL. AMER. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 5 (1984); The Role of Mental Health Professionalsin the Criminal Process: The
Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980).
9 Bills to Amend Title 18 to Limit the Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1982) (statement of
Richard J. Bonnie).
10Insanity Defense, 18 U.S.C.S. § 20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that,
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate
the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect
does not otherwise constitute a defense. . . . The defendant has the burden
of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.
'1 American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. Sta. 7-6.1
(approved by The House of Delegates in 1984).
12 Particularly a thesis of his book: N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1982) (advocating abolition of the special defense of insanity).
13 See, e.g., Herman, Book Review, A.B.F. RES. J. 385 (1985) (reviewing N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982)). Among the more than thirty book reviews
of MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW,

the following make a particularly special contribu-

tion: Johnson, Book Review, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1534 (1983); Richards, Book Review,
61 TEX. L. REV. 1557 (1983); von Hirsch, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (1984);
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14
way prominently into the proposal of the American Medical Association
to abolish the insanity defense as such.' s

As the plans for the debate began to unfold I was concerned about
the possibility that the subject matter might already be jaded, or in any
event no longer would be a "hot topic" for our potential audience. Being quite familiar with the writings of our Advocates and therefore particularly susceptible to the reader-listener rehash syndrome, I was

nonetheless hopeful that what had the potential for being old-hat would
instead be new and interesting to those members of the audience not professionally committed to intimate familiarity with the subject matter.

While I had expected that these issues, aired in the setting of a debate,
would be more exciting and immediate than even the extraordinary written scholarship of both erudite visitors, I hadn't expected the remarkable
level of intensity, originality and profundity to which all of us were

treated.
The Advocates addressed many aspects of the problem; and indeed

disagreed (in emphasis at least) over the significance of the insanity defense
and Morse, Book Review, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485 (1984). The interesting reviews in the
more philosophical journals are Moore, Book Review, 95 ETHICS 909 (1985) and Adels-

tein, Book Review, 92

ETHICS

579 (1982). See also Jerome, Book Review, 3

CRIM. JUST.

ETHICS 62 (1984).
"4On December 6, 1983, the American Medical Association's House of Delegates
approved and adopted the Report of the American Medical Ass'n Board of Trustees:
The Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Limitations of Psychiatric Testimony (1983).
See Holden, Insanity Defense Reexamined: The AMA Recommends Its Abolition But
Lawyers and PsychiatristsSay That Would Undermine the Moral Basis of Criminal Law,
SCIENCE,

December 2, 1983, at 994A.

" The proposal would eliminate "insanity" as a separate and special defense, but
would admit proof of aberrational mental condition where relevant to the existence or
nonexistence of mens rea.
Recently the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association issued a joint report reconciling their earlier differences as best they could. Joint
Statement of the American Medical Association and The American PsychiatricAssociation Regarding The Insanity Defense, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1135 (1985). While each
group retained its basic position of the operation of mental illness in the courtroom process of guilt consideration, the report emphasized fundamental agreement on the following
propositions: 1) application of the different proposals might generate important data
that might require modification of the AMA's and APA's views (e.g., data on how the
defense is administered, the type of offenders who have succeeded and who have failed
in their assertion of the defense, and "the degree to which human consideration and effective psychiatric treatment have been afforded to mentally disordered offenders, whether
acquitted or not"); 2) that more humane treatment be given to mentally ill criminals;
3) that it is unfortunate that our adversary system highlights differences among
psychiatrists where there may also be large areas of agreement; and 4) that it is deplorable
when forensic psychiatrists misuse their medical expertise at trials, stretching "their medical
opinion beyond legitimate, established, scientific and medical knowledge." Id. at 1135-36.
Some of these issues were also addressed in the more broadly ranging Debate which
follows.

116
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problem itself. Although the speakers treated their audience to a feast
of fresh relevancies, no subject was touched on lightly; each of the many
relevant observations and assertions were so expressed as to address the
deepest thought processes of the many attentive listeners.
Like a rare wine, this event met the test of aftertaste - in the corridors and offices and some classrooms (and even in the library). Indeed,
for many days after the event the Cleveland-Marshall community actively savored the ideas put forth. If I contributed to the success of the
debate at all, it may have been through an emphasis on the continued
opportunity for the debaters to reformulate the question. The format,
including cross-questioning between the Advocates, seemed to elicit the
best of both scholars as they engaged, and re-engaged each other, in the
finest tradition of our profession - learned argument. Rather than risk
spoiling it for the reader by advance substantive disclosures, I'll now
let the rich intellectual content of the great debate speak for itself.
Joel J. Finer

DEBATE
SHOULD THE INSANITY DEFENSE BE ABOLISHED?
*

Richard Bonnie - Advocate Against Abolition
**

Norval Morris - Advocate For Abolition

Professor Morris:
For purposes of this debate, it is necessary to clarify what is meant
by "the abolition of the insanity defense." What I am advocating, and
what the American Medical Association has proposed, is that there should
be no special defense of insanity to a criminal charge. In other words,
the ordinary common law-established principles of mens rea, intent,
recklessness, and knowledge should apply. Mental illness would be, as
an evidentiary matter, relevant to the question of guilt and of course
relevant to the question of punishment, but there would be no special
rules concerning a defense of insanity such as the M'Naghten Rule, 1 the
Durham Rule, 2 the rule proposed by the American Law Institute, or the
variations on them as advanced by Professor Bonnie.

* Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy,
University of Virginia. B.A. 1966, the Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1969, University of Virginia. Professor Bonnie is the principal architect of the position endorsed by
the American Bar Association and American Psychiatric Association with respect to the
insanity defense. He is the author of two publications pertinent to the current controversy:
The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1983, at 194; and Morality,
Equality and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the
CriminalLaw, 12 BULL. AMER. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 5 (1984). For additional background information, see the introduction to the debate beginning on page 113.
** Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology and former Dean, University
of Chicago Law School. LL.B. 1946, LL.M. 1947, University of Melbourne; Ph.D. 1949,
London University; LL.D. 1978, Villanova; LL.D. 1982, William Mitchell University.
Professor Morris' writings provided the scholarly foundations of the American Medical
Association's 1983 Report urging abolition of the insanity defense. In his most recent
book, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982), he advocates the abolition of the special
defense of insanity. For additional background information see the introduction to this
debate, beginning on page 113.
1 The M'Naghten Rule has been the traditional test applied for the insanity defense
and was first formulated in M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Under the
M'Naghten Rule the accused is not criminally culpable if at the time of committing the
act he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of mind as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing was wrong.
2 The Durham Rule derives from Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1954). Under this approach if there is some evidence that the accused suffered from a
diseased or defective mental condition at the time the unlawful act was committed the
accused is not criminally responsible if it is found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
act was the product of such abnormality.
117
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With this distant audience stretching way up to the far and vaulted
ceiling, theological comment seems appropriate. St. Augustine provides
the text: "Oh, to distinguish the reality of things from the tyranny of
words." That passage crystalizes the problem that has beset the special
defense of insanity since its inception. It is surrounded in a flood of words,
and some of them are very nice words. Many are good sounding words
but, I think, largely misleading words. My task is to persuade you of that.
Let me say first of all that the question is not of much importance to
crime rates. The defense of insanity is a minute part of the squalor of
the American criminal justice system. There are only about 3,500 people held as not guilty by the reason of insanity at the present moment
in the United States. In Illinois there are about 120. Virtually all of them
would, in any event, be locked up somewhere. The numbers involved
are small, though the cases in which the defense is raised are sensational.
Ultimately, Professor Bonnie and I agree that whatever happens to the
special insanity defense it will have very little effect on the incidence of
crime in the United States.
My position on this issue is not based on theoretical speculation, though
I hope I've done my share of that. Rather, it is based on observing the
operation of the special insanity defense in many states and in many countries. If you want to see the relationship between mental illness and
criminality, go to the city courts of first instance; go to the jails; go to
the prisons, particularly, the psychiatric divisions of the prisons. There
you will see a large amount of psychopathology amongst convicted and
about-to-be-convicted criminals. In an important sense, we don't really
have a defense of insanity. What we have is a rarely pleaded defense
that is pleaded in sensational cases, or in particularly ornate homicide
cases where-the lawyers, the psychiatrists, and the community seem to
enjoy their plunge into the moral debate. Though the insanity defense
is not raised for minor crimes, there is certainly a great deal of
psychopathology amongst those who commit such crimes. The special
defense of insanity is a rare genuflection to values we neither achieve
nor seek elsewhere in the criminal justice system. And when we do find
the accused person not guilty by reason of insanity, it is my experience
that we lock him up in a prison within a mental hospital which is often
quite like the prison in which he would have been locked up had he been
convicted. I have found this to be true in many other countries. In the
summer of 1984, I worked at the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg. Nearby
I found a state mental hospital that was better than any state mental
hospital in the United States. Built inside the mental hospital was a little
prison for those who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Underlying my position on the insanity defense as a special defense,
is asuspicion that we are dealing with a process that is used for purposes other than crime control; it is certainly not ordinary common lawdeveloped doctrine. The more I have studied this topic, the more my
suspicion has been confirmed. I see the special defense of insanity as a
somewhat hypocritical tribute to a feeling that we had better preserve

1986-87]

DEBATE-INSANITY DEFENSE ABOLITION?

some rhetorical elements of the moral infrastructure of the criminal law.
In that regard it is a tribute to hypocrisy, not an operating doctrine.
The special defense now attracts great interest in this country mainly
for one reason: John Hinckley's affection for Jodie Foster, and his
somewhat extraordinary way of expressing that affection. Doctrine that
had its genesis 140 years ago and had reached a reasonable degree of
status in this country after the Durham-Brawner3 excursion, followed
by widespread acceptance of the American Law Institute tests, was applied in the Hinckley case. The doctrine led, entirely appropriately, to
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. 4 I say "entirely appropriately"
since it seems quite clear to me that the trial judge in the Hinckley case,
an excellently trained product of the University of Chicago Law School,
accurately instructed the jury on the then relevant law, and that the jury,
if they were to follow that direction, had no choice but to find Hinckley
not guilty by reason of insanity. In the ensuing political turmoil, the
federal law regarding the special defense of insanity was amended to its
present state of unprincipled compromise. And for this Richard Bonnie
bears some responsibility since his views were expressly accepted by the
American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric Association,
with both organizations then being influential in the Congressional decision. By contrast, my views were expressly accepted by the American
Medical Association and proved wonderfully unsuccessful in Congress.
The audience tonight, you see, is being harangued by a poor loser.
It is my contention that the special defense of insanity is an unprincipled compromise for the reason that it distracts from the real issues.
The real issues concern the organization and allocation of such psychiatric
resources as we are prepared to bring to bear on the very serious and
practical problems of the relationship between mental illness and crime.
Instead of addressing those issues, however, we spill much ink, and waste
much typescript on an irrelevancy. We turn from difficult practical issues
to interminable moral posturing, pretending that we are in fact acquitting those who fall within the special defense. But those, like John
Hinckley, who are found not guilty by reason of insanity are not in any
sense acquitted, for they are not free of the stigma of guilt, nor are they
physically freed. In my view, they have been doubly stigmatized as both
mad and criminal, and it has been my observation that their treatment
follows these assumptions. The new Federal Criminal Code does not treat
them as innocent; it does not treat them as susceptible to the ordinary
3The Brawner Rule was the result of United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), which overruled Durham, holding that the accused is not responsible for

criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect,
he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
' See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F.Supp. 1342 (D.D.C.) op. clarified, reconsideration denied, 529 F.Supp. 520 (D.D.C.), aff'd., 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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civil commitment rules, and it does not treat them as being susceptible
to the ordinary punishment rules.
The special defense of insanity was more sensible when it was used
primarily as a means to avoid the capital punishment of those who suffered serious psychological disturbances at the time of the crime. But
that is not its role today. Not many of us are in favor of the execution
of mentally ill murderers, and so, putting the issue of capital punishment aside, we are left with a situation in which we pretend to acquit,
pretend to give full moral force to a doctrine, but then don't give it. So
again, I am a little suspicious.
Likewise, I do not consider the special defense to be of great assistance
to those found not guilty by reason of insanity. There is some emerging
evidence, and there is certainly an emerging practice, that all psychiatric
treatments are based on an effort to manipulate the patient's sense of
responsibility for his own conduct. Like it or not, the mentally ill must
remain, in a personal sense, responsible for their past conduct if they
are ever to wrench some satisfaction from their lives.
I stated earlier that the special defense is a false classification; I think
it is false in four respects. It is false psychologically, false morally, false
politically, and false symbolically. Though I am quite confident with
respect to the first three, I am genuinely in doubt about the fourth, the
symbolic role of the special defense.
First, the psychological fallacy: if it were possible to identify those
criminals who are most psychologically disturbed, I seriously doubt they
would be the same 3,500 now held as not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI). I have studied the cases of fifty-eight people who were found
not guilty by reason of insanity and who are now being held in the
Manteno Mental Hospital, the major institution in Illinois for holding
this group. In Manteno, a small prison was built within the mental
hospital. NGRI patients held there are subject to different grounds
privileges, different working arrangements, and different security
privileges than other mentally ill patients. The reason for that structure
is more than the fear of escape; NGRI patients are more manipulative,
more criminal, and less psychologically disturbed than other patients.
By contrast, when one looks at non-NGRI cases confined within the
psychiatric divisions of prisons, one finds many prisoners who are much
more seriously psychologically disturbed than NGRIs. Often, the
psychological disturbances of the non-NGRIs are closely related to the
criminal conduct, yet these convicts have never been the subject of the
special defense of insanity. The special defense simply does not embrace
those who are most in need of psychiatric treatment nor those who are
the least morally culpable.
The prison I know best in the Federal system is located in Butner, North
Carolina. This institution has applied some of the plans I developed in
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The Future of Imprisonment.5 The Butner facility has a section for 150
psychotic prisoners, i.e., those who have recently had a serious psychotic
episode. Though most of these prisoners never asserted the special defense,
they are clearly a more disturbed group than those I find at the Manteno
Mental Hospital in Illinois. The point I am making is that by the extraordinary language of a special defense, we have not selected those
who commit criminal acts and are most psychologically disturbed, nor
do many people think we have. The special defense of insanity is,
therefore, false psychologically.
Second, the moral fallacy: the standard justification given for the special
defense of insanity is that it is unjust to punish where we cannot blame.
The argument goes like this: People have free choice to do good or ill.
If they choose to do ill, they may be blamed and punished. But if they
do not choose to do ill, it is morally insensitive to punish them. I think
that is a fair statement of the position.
That line of argument, I think, makes several erroneous assumptions.
First, it makes the assumption that whether or not someone is responsible for his acts is a yes/no question, when obviously it is on a continuum
and poses a difficult problem of linedrawing. Second, it makes the
assumption that defects in a person's ability to choose are to be given
a larger exculpatory effect than all other pressures on human behavior.
It assumes that the psychotic is more morally innocent than the person
gravely sociologically deprived and pressed towards criminality. The
validity of that assumption is questionable.
If you were going to select those people who were most likely to commit serious crimes you would not take a psychiatrist with you; rather,
you would take a policeman or at least someone who knew the town
well. You would search for your future serious criminals in the innercity deprived areas. My point is that social adversity, with its generations of destroyed families, is much more criminogenic than psychosis,
and is even more unavoidable for the child born to an impoverished
inheritance.
The special defense of insanity is therefore a morally false classification. It is pretentious in the extreme to think that anyone has the sufficiently sensitive caliber to make these delicate moral judgments. It is
pretending to do St. Peter's job, and not one of us is any good at it.
It surpasses human competence.
Professor Bonnie:
Professor Morris said that it would be pretentious to make the moral
judgments that need to be made. His understandable reluctance emphasizes one of the main points that I want to make, namely, that this
whole issue ultimately boils down to one of moral intuition. I believe
that we ought to submit some of these cases to juries in order to express
I N.

MORRIS,

THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT

(1974).
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the moral intuitions of the community. The fact that the questions are
hard to answer does not mean that we should not ask them.
Professor Morris and I are debating the insanity defense because we
are supposedly experts on the subject, but I am not sure that resolution
of this issue requires expertise at all. In fact, it reminds me of a statement made by a Fairfax County police officer who, upon thoughtfully
surveying a crime scene, concluded: "This crime was definitely committed by criminals." Though I believe the insanity defense is morally required, I cannot prove that my moral judgment is correct.
At the outset, before turning to the matters in dispute, let me note
a few points on which Professor Morris and I agree. First, it's clear that
the insanity defense has nothing to do with the crime rate. Abolishing
the insanity defense should not be viewed as an instrument of crime control. I might note in passing, however, that during his tenure as Attorney
General of the United States, William French Smith testified in support
of the Reagan Administration's initial proposal (which endorsed Professor Morris' view), arguing that abolition of the insanity defense was
necessary "to restore effective law enforcement." (Even in a "gentle"
debate, I couldn't resist making this observation.)
The second point we agree upon is that the insanity defense is an empirically insignificant feature of the penal law. There is no question about
that. The defense is rarely raised and less often successful, but that does
not mean it is unimportant. In the case in which mental disorder seems
morally relevant to the assessment of responsibility, I think it is important to get it right, or at least to try to get it right. The fact that insanity
claims are not raised very often should not dissuade us from struggling
to formulate morally sound criteria. We recognize the defense of duress,
for example, yet this defense is probably raised no more than five times
per year. The insanity defense is raised significantly more than that-in
at least hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases.
I also agree with Professor Morris that persons acquitted by reason
of insanity represent only a very small fraction of mentally disordered
offenders, and that mental health services in the prisons and jails, where
most of these people are confined, are typically appalling. This tradition of neglect should be reversed, but I do not see how abolishing the
insanity defense is going to contribute to that goal. I also agree that services provided in forensic units for the "criminally insane"- that is, for
people acquitted by reason of insanity-are also inadequate virtually
everywhere and should be improved. But I do not see how abolishing
the insanity defense and sending these patients to the same facilities that
confine convicted prisoners would improve their treatment. In fact, I
have no doubt that conditions would deteriorate if that course were taken.
If we retain the insanity defense, the state assumes a constitutional duty, whether or not it is now fulfilled, to provide treatment, and to avoid
punitive conditions. Without the insanity defense, the provision of these
services would be a matter of grace. Therefore, the insanity defense at

1986-871

DEBATE-INSANITY DEFENSE ABOLITION?

least provides pressure for the improvement of these conditions to which
Professor Morris and I both object.
We also agree that the insanity defense is not an efficient device for
identifying those mentally ill offenders who are most in need of psychiatric
hospitalization. As Professor Morris put it, the insanity defense is not
an efficient device for identifying the most psychologically disturbed offenders or those who need the most intense psychiatric treatment. But
that is not the purpose of the defense. Its purpose, I believe, is to affirm
and implement that fundamental principle of our penal law to which
Professor Morris alluded - the principle that criminal punishment should
not be imposed on people who cannot be fairly blamed for their conduct.
I do not believe that debate about the insanity defense distracts from
the plight of mentally disordered offenders in our prisons and jails. Indeed, if this is an empirical proposition rather than a rhetorical ploy,
my suspicion is that the debate catalyzed from time to time by the insanity defense actually tends to focus public attention on precisely the
problems that most trouble Professor Morris. Indeed, the placement and
treatment of mentally disordered offenders would not be likely to get
any attention at all if there were no debate about the insanity defense.
Finally, Professor Morris argues that successful treatment requires efforts to promote the patient's sense of personal responsibility for his conduct. I agree, but this observation has little to do with the issue before
us. The issue is the assessment of criminal responsibility and the determination whether criminalpunishment ought to be imposed on someone
who violated the penal law while mentally ill and severely disturbed.
Successful therapy does not require criminal condemnation.
Professor Morris does not question the proposition that criminal
punishment should be predicated upon blameworthiness. His argument,
rather, is that an independent insanity defense is not necessary to avoid
unjust punishment. He also argues that proof of mens rea - the purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence that may be required in the
definition of any given penal offense - is enough to establish a proper
moral basis for punishment.
I do not agree. The fundamental flaw in the mens rea approach is that
it is morally underinclusive. Mens rea requirements in the definition of
criminal offenses refer, for the most part, to conscious states of awareness.
They have no qualitative dimension. Thus, the technical effect of the
mens rea approach, if it were taken seriously, would be to limit the exculpatory significance of even a severe mental disorder to gross perceptual incapacities. It would cover only, or primarily, cases that never arise.
Proponents of the mens rea approach point out that it would exculpate
someone who squeezes a person's neck believing that he is squeezing
lemons; or, as the Attorney General testified, someone who believes he
is shooting a tree when he is shooting a person. But we all know that
these cases do not exist.
In short, I believe that Professor Morris' approach fails to take adequate account of the morally significant effects of severe mental illness.
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Specifically, it does not encompass claims of delusional motivation, or
the severe impairment of insight or judgment so manifestly evident in
cases of gross psychotic deterioration. In order to encompass what I
believe to be the range of claims which ought to have exculpatory
significance in the penal law, there must be some criterion (and we can
debate about what kind of criterion that would be) which is extrinsic
to the definition of mens rea. My own view is that the criterion should
be whether the defendant was unable, as a result of mental disease, to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense.
This formulation is both necessary and sufficient to encompass what I
believe to be the claims that ought to have exculpatory significance. That,
in a nutshell, is the core of our disagreement.
I want to emphasize again that the disagreement turns on differences
in moral intuition. Each of us has had a great deal of experience in mental hospitals, prisons, and in criminal courts. Our moral intuitions obviously differ. I do not think that our disagreement has anything to do
with differences of opinion about the state of scientific knowledge or
medical expertise, even though that issue is frequently raised in connection with the insanity defense today.
Though I have made this moral assertion, I do not believe that you
are in a position to judge it in the absence of some clinical context.
Therefore, I would like to describe two cases to illustrate what I believe
to be the moral difficulty with the mens rea approach.
The first case involved a thirty-one year old woman - I will call her
Joy Baker - who shot and killed her aunt. 6 Let me say that this is a
real case, a case that was actually evaluated at our Institute's forensic
clinic in about 1974, as I recall. Joy Baker grew up in a fundamentalist
area in central Virginia. According to her account, which no one has
ever doubted, she became increasingly agitated and fearful during the
days before the shooting. This was due in large part to some considerable
psychological provocation by her husband who claimed that she was
an adulteress and that he was going to kill her. She was very worried.
She became increasingly agitated and fearful that her dogs, her children
(aged eight and eleven), and her neighbors were becoming possessed by
the devil and that she was going to be "annihilated," as she put it.
On the morning of the shooting, after a sleepless night, she ran frantically around the house clutching a gun to her breast. She was worried
about what the children might do to her if they became demonically
possessed and what she might do to them if she had to defend herself.
She made the children read and reread the Twenty-third Psalm as a means
of protecting them from her. Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, her aunt
arrived and drove into the driveway. Unable to open the locked front
6 See
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door, and ignoring Joy Baker's frantic pleas to go away, her aunt came
to the back door. Mrs. Baker was standing there with a gun clutched
to her breast yelling to her aunt not to come in. As her aunt suddenly
reached into the broken screening to unlock the door, Mrs. Baker shot
her. The aunt then fell backward into the mud behind the porch, bleeding
profusely. "Why, Joy?" she asked. "Because you're the devil and you
came to hurt me," Joy answered. Her aunt said, "Honey, no, I came here
to help you." And at this point Mrs. Baker said she became very confused: "I took the gun and shot her again just to relieve the pain she
was having because she said she was hurt."
The psychiatrists who examined Mrs. Baker concluded that she was
acutely psychotic at the time she killed her aunt. The arresting police
officer and others in the small rural Virginia community likewise felt
that she must have been crazy at the time of the shooting. Mrs. Baker
asserted the insanity defense and was acquitted. Clearly, had there been
no special insanity defense she could have been acquitted only in defiance of the law. Although she was clearly out of touch with reality
and unable to understand the wrongfulness of her conduct, she had the
criminal intent, or mens rea, required for some form of homicide. If we
look only at her conscious motivation for the second shot and do not
take into account her highly regressed and disorganized emotional condition, then she was technically guilty of murder, since euthanasia, which
was her conscious motivation for the second shot, is no justification for
homicide. Moreover, even if the first shot had been fatal, she probably
would have been guilty of manslaughter since her delusional belief that
she was in imminent danger of demonic annihilation at her aunt's hands
was, by definition, an "unreasonable" belief. Under Virginia law, and
according to the law of many jurisdictions, a defendant is not entitled
to acquittal on grounds of self defense if his or her belief in the necessity
for defensive action is unreasonable.
It is conceivable, of course, that, if there were no insanity defense,
evidence concerning Joy Baker's mental condition might be introduced
to negate mens rea despite the fact, as I have shown, that her claim does
not establish a legal basis for exculpation. Moreover, a jury instructed
only on mens rea might choose to ignore the law and decide, very bluntly,
whether such a defendant was simply too crazy to be convicted. In my
judgment, however, the cause of rational criminal law reform is not well
served by designing legal rules in the expectation that they will be ignored or nullified when they appear to be unjust in individual cases.
I think Joy Baker's case demonstrates why the law would be unjust
if it failed to take into account delusional motivation and impairment
of insight and judgment associated with psychotic deterioration. The mens
rea approach draws a distinction between crazy perceptions and crazy
beliefs. In my view, that distinction is both morally and clinically
arbitrary.
Another case also illustrates my point. It is one of the few reported
cases I have seen in which the defendant may actually have had a valid
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mens rea defense. The case was decided in England in 1979. 7 In this case,
the defendant Stephenson went to a large straw stack in a field and made
a hollow in the side of the stack because he was cold and he wanted
a place to sleep. Having hollowed out the stack, he still felt cold, so he
lit a fire of twigs and some additional straw inside the hollowed area
in the straw stack. The stack caught fire, of course, and damage of about
$7,000 occurred. He was charged with arson.
The mens rea for arson in England, as in most American jurisdictions,
is recklessness. The defendant is guilty if he was consciously aware of
the risk that his conduct could result in the burning of this particular
piece of property. The expert testimony in the case was that Stephenson
had a long history of schizophrenia. The expert testified that Stephenson's
condition made him quite capable "of lighting a fire to keep himself warm
in dangerous proximity to a straw stack without having taken that danger
into account." In other words, Stephenson "may not have had the same
ability to foresee or appreciate the risk as a mentally normal person."
Stephenson was not floridly psychotic. Although chronically
schizophrenic, he appears to have been able to function at a fairly significant level most of the time. He was not acutely decompensated when
this offense occurred. But suppose he had been. Suppose he had been
actively delusional, believing, for example, that demons were pursuing
him and that one of the demons was hiding in the stack of straw. Suppose he acted on this belief, burning the straw stack to destroy the
demons. I would say that a legal system that exculpates Stephenson
because he failed to "appreciate the risk" that lighting a fire would burn
down a stack of straw, but that refuses to exculpate him when he burns
it down to kill a demon he believes to be hiding inside, draws an arbitrary distinction and fails to take adequate account of the clinical
realities of severe mental illness. That is my case.
Dean Bogomolny:
Under our debate format we will now have a period of time for crossquestioning or conversations.
Professor Bonnie:
Professor Morris, do you really believe that punishment would be just
in a case like Joy Baker's?
Professor Morris:
It depends on what you mean by "punishment." Though I sympathize
with her greatly, I do think her conviction of crime could well conform
to the basic values of the criminal law. I think we must recognize that
we sometimes have to define rules of criminal law that tend to include
people with whom we are particularly sympathetic and of whom we
I Regina v. Stephenson, [1979] 1. Q.B. 695.
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should be particularly understanding. Your remark about euthanasia illustrates that this is such a case.
I recall being involved in a case in which an elderly man killed his
wife who was terminally ill and in great pain. She begged him to end
her suffering. He complied with her wishes and, afterward, called the
police and called his family. I became involved as a lawyer. I think we
reached the right result: we convicted him of murder and put him on
probation, his family being willing to care for and "supervise" him. I
know of no other way to go about it. I do not know how to deal with
euthanasia so as to avoid those sorts of problems without getting into
too many others. You can well produce "possessed-of-devil" cases, extreme cases, where I find great sympathy for the person I have to convict. Indeed, I genuinely sympathize with many people with whose convictions I am involved. And so plucking at my heart strings does not
push me to believe that you have a morally compelling case.
Professor Bonnie:
I would like to follow up with three comments and then another question. First, part of what I detect in your response is the notion that an
occasional injustice, if you will, is the price that we need to pay in order
to avoid mistakes.
Professor Morris:
No, I did not say injustice.
Professor Bonnie:
You do not think it is unjust?
Professor Morris:
I think it is right to convict both the husband who killed his wife in
the case I mentioned, and Joy Baker in your case.
Professor Bonnie:
Well, as I say, I think we have a difference in moral intuition about
the case. The second point I would make is that obviously the community
felt as I did, and it strikes me that it does not make sense for those of
us who formulate and apply the penal law to require conviction when
we know that it will offend the community's moral sentiments to do so.
I think that claims of insanity and some of these other claims, which
ultimately turn on moral judgment, are precisely the kinds of cases for
which we ought to rely on the community's moral intuitions, realizing,
of course, that there will be some close cases.
Professor Morris:
You want to rely on the community's moral intuitions, but the history
of the defense of insanity is that the community thinks it is a mechanism
for letting people off; that it is characterized historically by leniency,
fraud, and all sorts of complexities. The "community" is not instructed
about nor informed on the moral subtleties here. It is perhaps a mercy
that they are not because the subtleties are very difficult indeed.
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We have before us two cases-mine of the aged killer and yours of
Joy Baker-in which we wish we could devise systems, functioning
systems, that did not punish people whose criminal behavior we deeply
understand. As I see it, your Joy Baker is simply a person heavily pressed towards crime. I do not know whether she was possessed, or even
what that means, or whether she thought she was killing a person. If
she did, I see no way to avoid convicting her.
Professor Bonnie:
You do not see any way to avoid it if you adopt your approach. Now
with regard to the question of euthanasia, I would be willing to make
a similar argument. Obviously, the law cannot recognize mercy killing
as a justification for killing in terms of trying to shape the way people
behave. However, I do believe that a case might be made for recognizing a general defense of "situational excuse" or "situational compulsion"
under circumstances where people are so overwhelmed by the pressures
of a particular situation that they cannot fairly be blamed for having
behaved as they did. I think that cases such as the one you referred to
raise such claims, and I would favor adopting a rule which would put
to the jury the question whether an ordinary person in the defendant's
situation might have responded as this defendant did. I would take a
consistent position on this.
Professor Morris:
I respect your search for consistency, but I doubt that in either
euthanasia or insanity cases a workable moral consistency is achievable.
Values like this led the English in the Homicide Act of 1957, to introduce
a "diminished responsibility" doctrine which would most certainly cover
your lady, allowing her to be convicted for manslaughter rather than
murder.
Professor Bonnie:
But I do not want to convict her.
Professor Morris:
I understand that, but I am suggesting that the audience consider
another path which has rendered the special defense of insanity almost
moribund in England. It is now an extremely rare plea there since, in
homicide cases, it is the jury's role to decide whether there was a causal
relationship between the mental illness and the killing and, consequently, to declare the offense to be manslaughter rather than murder. This
gives the judge a much wider range of punishment, including hospital
orders and treatment orders. This approach has practically removed the
special defense of insanity from discussion in the United Kingdom. Recently, a delegation from the Home Office was in this country on another
matter, and I asked them why they will not abolish the special insanity
defense. They said, "Oh, we have enough troubles. It really doesn't exist
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operationally. Do we really want to talk in Parliament about things like
that?" To which I responded, "I suppose not."
So you can take a modulated position if you wish. If the law were
to include a general doctrine of exculpation for deeply understood
pressures leading to criminal tendencies, and did it not only for
euthanasia, but for mental illness and any other powerfully criminogenic
adversities, I would not oppose it; but then it would no longer be a special
defense of insanity.
Professor Bonnie:
You have raised two issues: the first involves blameworthiness and
the second, criminogenesis. Suppose that a legislature were persuaded
by your arguments against the special defense of insanity but wanted
to go a step further and exclude evidence of mental abnormality on mens
rea issues as well - or at least on those mens rea issues, such as
recklessness, that establish the minimum predicate for penal liability.
Suppose, for example, that the lawmakers concluded that they did not
want to acquit Stephenson in the case that I gave you earlier, even though,
assuming the psychiatrist was correct, he was not consciously aware of
the risk that the stack of straw would be burned. I take it that you would
not find that acceptable. My question to you, therefore, is why do you
feel that Stephenson's claim should have exculpatory significance but
not Joy Baker's claim?
Professor Morris:
I think that mental illness should be on the same footing, for purposes
of criminal responsibility, as blindness, deafness, or being a foreigner
not speaking the language-all of which are not infrequently relevant
to what we have called criminal guilt. Suppose that you point a gun at
me and say, "Believe me, I mean you no harm; I'm an FBI agent." Suppose further that I am deaf and cannot hear the words, and I shoot you.
There is no doubt that my deafness is admissible evidence on the question of self-defense. I think mental illness should be treated similarly.
The best criminal law doctrine that we have been able to devise says
that guilt exists when you do a prohibited act with a defined mens rea,
i.e., intent, recklessness, or negligence. Once we have established that
standard, it is desirable to hold all adults, for their sakes as well as our
own, responsible before the law. That is why the treatment question is
so important. We have a long history of attempts to treat people differently and be kind to them for their sakes, but we usually fail to do
so. We do not treat them gently. We tend to lock them up for longer
periods of time than if we had held them legally responsible for their
conduct.
Professor Bonnie:
I would have to agree with you, of course, if the assertion that
withholding blame was nothing more than a way of disguising punishment. I think it needs to be emphasized that I would not be supportive
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of the insanity defense if I felt that way. But I do want to explore the
question of blameworthiness at the outset because it seems to me that
that is at the core of our disagreement. You say that you would recognize
the exculpatory significance of evidence of mental disorder if it negated
mens rea because the mentally ill should be treated like everyone else,
and because they should be exculpated on the same terms as people who
might be deaf or blind.
It seems to me that the moral flaw in that reasoning is, as I suggested
earlier, that the mentally ill are not like people who have other types
of disabilities. It seems to me that, depending on one's moral intuitions,
recognition of this difference could lead in either of two directions. To
take a harsh view, we could refuse to take into account evidence of mental
illness in assessing mens rea for the same reason we do not take defective temperament and intelligence into account. If you think this would
be too harsh, it must be because mental illness is relevant to blameworthiness in a way that a quick temper is not. If that is so, why is there
any reason a priori to believe that the moral significance of mental illness is exhausted by criteria of mens rea? What I need to understand
is why the criteria of mens rea are so sacrosanct as to be exclusive
measures of blameworthiness.
Professor Morris:
Not sacrosanct, Professor Bonnie. I am prepared to try to work on
the mens rea doctrine and to develop its general principles, but it is the
best we now have. I think we have now reached the heart of the matter
and this is what I want to explore with you. You are the first person
who has raised in public with me what I think is the central question.
The mentally ill are different. They are different particularly for our
present purposes because there are defects in their choosing mechanism.
They are not different in that their ears are not like ours, nor their eyes,
nor their language. For our present purposes, they are different only in
this one quality: their choosing instrument is different from ours. The
thrust of Professor Bonnie's point, as I understand it, is that defects in
the choosing mechanism of man are to be given different effect than
pressures on the choosing process of man.
I think this position embraces a fundamental error. It assumes that
there is something called "mind" which itself does the choosing. My observation of behavior, and my reading, lead me to accept Hume's theory
rather than Descartes'. The duality between body and mind has to be
abandoned if we are to think rationally about human behavior. We have
to recognize that man's behavior is a product both of his endogenous
capacities (which may not only be mind, but may be blood pressure,
electrical stimuli, and the chemical speed of the synapses) and of all exogenous pressures on that behavior.
This all sounds fancy, I know, but I do not apologize for it. It is a
difficult question. I believe that the understanding of human behavior,
the understanding of man, demands that we try to measure the widest
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variety of exogenous pressures on endogenous capacities. It is a mistake
to attribute any behavior simply to "mind."
To summarize, behavior cannot be understood in terms of pressures
on an individual, followed by a choice. It is not like that. Behavior is
a product of a constant interaction of the totality of endogenous and
exogenous pressures, and the only way to understand behavior is to include both. When you do take both into account you begin to understand why people do the things they do, and when you begin to understand that, you have gone as far as moral intuition can go. Beyond that
it is mere guesswork. This is where the defense of insanity has not been
properly explored. I would like people to do much more work on whether
a different effect should be given to mind processes than to other pressures
on people in relation to choice.
Let me return to the other differences between Professor Bonnie's position and mine. I am not sure how far apart we are on a variety of things.
I am not sure how far apart we are, for example, on the point I made
earlier that the special defense of insanity detracts from the real issues.
The law books are full of defense of insanity cases, and whenever
psychiatrists talk about law they talk about the defense of insanity. I
believe these discussions divert attention away from the major issues of
mental illness and crime. I am told, however, and I think Professor Bonnie
believes, that we protect the moral infrastructure of the criminal law by
allowing a special defense of insanity; at least this is the language often
used. But what little protection it really is. In fact, his proposals for
reforming the defense would limit the number of those cases even more,
leaving it very, very rarely applicable indeed.
Let me give you an example of a case where the defense should never
have been applied but was nonetheless invoked. In Jones v. United States,8
the defendant attempted to steal a jacket from a store in the District of
Columbia. The maximum punishment for this offense was one year's
imprisonment. Counsel of astonishing incompetence pleaded him not guilty by the reason of insanity. Jones was thereafter committed to St.
Elizabeth's, a hospital for the mentally ill. After some time he realized,
in his disturbed state, that he had been poorly defended, so he obtained
new counsel to work on the matter. Counsel took the matter to the
Supreme Court of the United States which decided, as a matter of law,
that Jones could be held longer on the insanity plea than he could have
been held had he been convicted for the attempted shoplifting. The maximum penalty for shoplifting was one year, though he probably would
have served only two or three months. Now, instead, he could be confined indeterminately and need not be released under the same procedures
and standards as a civilly committed person. Assumptions both of continuity of mental illness and continuity of dangerousness flowed from
his conviction.
' 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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Professor Bonnie:
I began by taking note of the fact that the insanity defense, as I propose it, would be narrow. That is precisely the point. I believe that there
ought to be an insanity defense, an independent defense of insanity, but
it ought to be narrow in scope. And I believe that the kinds of cases
that it should be designed for are those involving the gross psychotic
deterioration that I think Joy Baker was experiencing. I do not want a
lot of people to be acquitted by reason of insanity, only those for whom
a criminal conviction would be unjust. From what I know of the record
in the Jones case, I do not think that was an appropriate insanity case
to begin with. I also agree with you that Jones' attorney should not have
raised the defense in light of its dispositional consequences.
Professor Morris:
Even if he were very crazy, you would not plead the insanity defense?
Professor Bonnie:
Not in the Jones case, because strategic considerations are relevant in
the litigation of any criminal case. In particular, the Jones case raises
a dispositional question. Let me sketch my position on the disposition
of insanity acquittees and see whether you find it acceptable. A person
who has committed a violent crime, who has behaved dangerously, and
who is subsequently acquitted by reason of insanity based on a determination that his dangerous behavior was related to mental disorder,
is not on the same legal or moral footing as you or I or anyone else who
is subject to ordinary involuntary civil commitment. The reason is that
our civil commitment laws, as they have been reformed, have a decidedly
libertarian cast, and for good reason. They reflect the view that we ought
to err on the side of liberty, and that we ought to intervene in someone's
life on the ground that he or she needs treatment only in extreme cases
and for a short period of time. The civil commitment law rests on a paternalistic premise, and paternalistic interventions should be limited in scope
and duration. Specifically, society ought to bear the risk of error in making predictions about whether a person is imminently dangerous to himself
or, whether upon release, he will be dangerous to himself in the future.
The person acquitted by reason of insanity, in my opinion, stands on
a different footing. If that person has in fact behaved violently and endangered the life or safety of another person, he has manifested his
dangerousness. Under those circumstances, it seems to me, a theoretically
sound and morally proper scheme of therapeutic restraint-which is what
it ought to be, and not punishment-can be based on the view that the
acquittee, not society, should bear the risk of erroneous predictions concerning the need for and duration of hospitalization.
The hard question, again, is by what criteria we should decide how
long the acquittee should bear the risk of error. While this is not the
time to struggle with that question, it is enough to note that the time
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period for civil commitment (six months in Virginia, thirty days in California) does not provide a proper marker. In short, I think there is a way
to design a special dispositional system for insanity acquittees without
making it a disguised form of punishment or an indefensible scheme of
preventive confinement. The Supreme Court went much further than
this in Jones, and I disagree with that aspect of the decision. However,
to the extent that you argue that any scheme that differs from the ordinary civil commitment scheme is a disguised punishment or an indefensible form of preventive confinement, I respectfully disagree.
Professor Morris:
There are so many things I want to pursue. Let me pursue this one,
because I feel I ought to at this point. The others I do not find quite as
interesting. Professor Bonnie does not include control of volitional defects
as meriting exculpatory effect. He only gives exculpatory effect to
cognitive defects, to the incapacity to appreciate wrongness. For him,
cognitive defects should have exculpatory effect and volitional defects
should not. As a moral matter, not as a prudential matter, surely defects
of control capacity should be given the same moral and exculpatory reach
as defects of cognitive capacity. Why not?
Professor Bonnie:
Because it is a moral matter. My observations and experience have
not revealed cases involving morally compelling claims of volitional impairment. The classic cases are the compulsions. The example always
given in the debates on the insanity defense, back when the Model Penal
Code was being drafted, was kleptomania. Quite frankly, I have never
seen a kleptomaniac, but I have seen pyromaniacs. Based on my observations of cases involving pyromaniacs and relying upon my own moral
intuition, I am convinced that these offenders are blameworthy and that
their punishment is just. For purposes of argument, however, I am willing to concede that there might be a case in which a jury would find
the special insanity defense morally compelling due solely to volitional
impairment. I would still oppose the volitional inquiry on, as you put
it, "prudential" grounds.
The dangers of the volitional inquiry are too great because it is so
unstructured. In contrast, I believe that the cognitive/affective inquiry
that I mean to encompass by the appreciation formula is manageable.
It is possible to structure the expert opinion and to structure the jury's
inquiry. It is impossible, however, to structure the volitional inquiry.
Essentially, what you are asking the expert is: "Please explain, if you
can, why this person did this." Then you are asking the jury to decide
whether the defendant's capacity to choose to do otherwise than he did
was so impaired that he should not be exculpated. That is simply a moral
guess. Moreover, if you do not have a narrow definition of mental disease
- and most courts that apply the volitional prong of the Model Penal
Code test appear to regard any "mental disorder" as legally sufficient
to raise the defense - then a verdict of acquittal is legally permissible
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anytime an expert witness can be found to testify that the defendant had
an identifiable mental abnormality. The expert could then develop a
psychodynamic formulation explaining why the defendant did what he
did. The result is a completely unstructured inquiry about the causes
of every defendant's criminal behavior.
If the law is willing to open the door to open-ended claims about the
determinants of the defendant's behavior, then I come to your side. I
do not know why mental illness is special. Perhaps, as Judge Bazelon
ultimately proposed, we should put before the jury all that can be said
about the forces that predisposed the defendant to behave as he did. Of
course, since I do not think that is what we should be asking in a criminal
trial, I reject the whole thing.
Professor Morris:
It is interesting how we come together. I think that the cognitive inquiry is almost as speculative as the volitional inquiry, and that probably explains much of the difference between us. But I want to be nasty
now and caricature your position so that you can respond to it.
Professor Bonnie:
You called it an unprincipled compromise, or something like that.
Professor Morris:
That was not being nasty - that was being generous. As I listened
to you I recalled an article I wrote, decades ago, in which I observed
that the special defense of insanity reminded me of a piece of visual art
- a painting by Freud. It was a scene of massive violence; a sort of a
drunken, naked, "Rape of the Sabine Women" on a huge canvas, full
of impropriety. In a little corner of the canvas there was a bluebird fleeing from the scene of unclothed horror. A lady of uncertain age sat in
front of this picture with a little easel, painfully copying the bluebird
and worrying over the color of its beak. I suggested in my article that
the bluebird represented the defense of insanity and the lady, those who
wrote about it. When I sent it off to a law review, I said I did not know
whether Freud's painting appeared in the Grove Press Edition of Freud's
Wit in Relation to the Subconscious, or in some other edition. I also mentioned as possible another publisher of pornography. And in technical
law review fashion, the editor wrote back to me asking, "Which?" Of
course, as far as I know, Freud never ventured into visual arts.
Isn't painting bluebirds what we are doing tonight? We have been
discussing an extraordinarily rare "possessed-of-devil" case in which Professor Bonnie aspires to a moral basis from a mass of other problems.
I think Professor Bonnie is the painter sitting in front of Freud's picture.
Professor Bonnie:
I would be perfectly happy to be elsewhere tonight, and I would be
perfectly happy not to talk about the insanity defense and not to have
anyone else talk about it, as long as the defense continues to be written
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into the fabric of the law, permitting exculpation in morally compelling
cases. I do not know why you keep arguing about arguing about it.
Professor Morris:
It is not arguing about arguing. My point is that the fact that you and
others insist on having a special defense of insanity is precisely what
distracts lawyers and psychiatrists from a more thoughtful, substantive
consideration of the relation between mental illness and crime.
Professor Bonnie:
I want to get it right.
Professor Morris:
You want to get euthanasia right too.
Professor Bonnie:
I do want to get that right, but I want to get this right more. Earlier,
you raised the issue of criminogenesis. I think that your argument is off
the point. I reject the notion that the distinction between mental illness
and gross social adversity is morally indefensible. It may very well be
that poverty or, as one member of the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit characterized it, a "rotten social background," is significantly more
criminogenic than psychosis. But, I do not think this observation calls
into doubt the moral basis for the insanity defense. The insanity defense
is not based on the claim that mental illness is criminogenic. Nor, as I
indicated earlier in my comments on the volitional prong, do I think
the inquiry should focus on whether mental illness caused the defendant's
behavior, or whether the defendant was strongly predisposed by mental illness to behave as he did.
The operative concept underlying the insanity defense is that an acute
impairment of mental functioning at the time of the offense is morally
relevant to blameworthiness. After all, the entire culpability structure
of the penal law, including mens rea, focuses on the defendant's mental
functioning at the time of the offense rather than on how the person got
to be the way he is. The moral basis of the insanity defense rests on the
judgment that acute impairments of mental or emotional functioning
which may have affected the defendant's perceptions, beliefs and motivations at the time of the offense, ought to have exculpatory significance
under certain circumstances. This leads me to conclude that the distinction between mental illness, which may be directly relevant to mental
functioning, and social adversity, which never is, is not a morally false
classification.
CLOSING STATEMENT: PROFESSOR BONNIE

I would like to organize my remarks around the following theme. I
think Professor Morris and other people who endorse the mens rea approach, or as we have characterized it, "abolition of the insanity defense,"
make at least five different types of arguments. Professor Morris has
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touched on most of them tonight. I would like to use my closing remarks
to respond to each of these arguments.
The first is the charge of hypocrisy. As I indicated earlier, if the real
consequence of this supposed exculpation is the imposition of punishment in a different key-C minor instead of C major-then perhaps the
defense is, as Professor Morris has written, a tribute more to our
hypocrisy than to our morality. If we were imposing punishment on those
whom we proclaim to be blameless, this would be as much an affront
to the moral integrity of the penal law as I believe it is to convict Joy
Baker. But if one believes, as I do, that punishment is not morally appropriate in such cases, the correct answer is surely to avoid a covert
punitive disposition, not to erase the defense and substitute an overtly
punitive one. Therefore, the answer to the argument from hypocrisy is
not abolition of the insanity defense.
Another point about the charge of hypocrisy also needs to be raised.
I indicated earlier that I believe it is not hypocritical to take the position
that the insanity acquittee should be subject to hospitalization under
somewhat more restrictive circumstances than would be possible under
the libertarian civil commitment statutes that we now have. Indeed, the
problem of designing a civil commitment scheme-a special dispositional
statute, if you will-must be addressed even under the mens rea approach.
That is, even under Professor Morris' proposal, it is still necessary to
decide what to do with a person who is acquitted because he lacked the
mens rea due to mental disease. This person is different from the "normal" person who lacked mens rea, and there is correspondingly greater
reason to be concerned about the social danger presented by such a person. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the American Medical Association, which has endorsed Professor Morris' approach, was willing to endorse a specific dispositional statute for mens rea-acquittees that is much
more restrictive than normal civil commitment statutes. Under the AMA
proposal, a presumption of continuing dangerousness would arise, and
the release decision would lie exclusively with a court rather than the
facility. I have no doubt that legislatures would be inclined to do the
same thing. Viewed from this angle, the mens rea approach fails to erase
the hypocrisy, if that is what it is; it merely reduces it.
The second line of abolitionist argument is that the insanity defense
is an aberration, a departure from what has been a settled reliance on
mens rea to define the class of blameworthy offenders in the penal law.
Professor Morris has argued that the independent defense of insanity
originated in the 19th century and that adoption of the mens rea approach
would return the law to the earlier and wiser state of affairs. I believe
that this view is historically unsound and is not an accurate description
of the culpability structure of the penal law or the origins of the insanity defense.
I do not have time for anything more than a few conclusory observations at this point, but I ask your indulgence. First, there are a variety
of contexts in which the law recognizes claims of excuse that are
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extrinsic to the definition of the offense. Duress is one of them. A person who engages in criminal behavior because someone is threatening
him or holding a gun to his head and who succumbs to that coercive
pressure because he is not a hero is entitled to put that claim before the
jury even though he had the mens rea for the offense. Again, that is a
rare case. There are other cases. A closer one to the present topic is involuntary intoxication. The commentators from the earliest days
recognize that involuntary intoxication ought to be a defense even though
the individual might have had the mens rea for the offense; in fact, the
exculpatory criterion is typically tied to the insanity defense in these cases.
As for the origins of the insanity defense, this is too large a topic to
cover in the thirty seconds that I am going to devote to it. The central
point is this: The insanity defense emerged as an independent defense
because the culpability structure of the common law was essentially objective in character. Through use of a variety of evidentiary presumptions, a defendant who caused harm was liable if he failed to perceive
or foresee what an ordinary reasonable person would have perceived
or foreseen. At the root of the common law was the presumption that
every person was capable of behaving like an ordinary reasonable person, and was therefore capable of having a "guilty mind" or mens rea.
The only way to evade that presumption was to invoke the insanity
defense or the defense of infancy, claiming in essence: "I am not an ordinary person." The common law took such claims into account through
the use of these independent defenses of insanity and infancy. It was only
through these devices that an entirely subjective assessment of blameworthiness was possible.
The issue that became disputed in the 19th century centered around
the criteria to be used for defining the category of offenders to whom
the presumption (conclusive as to everyone else) would not be applied.
Accordingly, it was often said that "insane" offenders were those that
lacked the capacity to have mens rea or "criminal intent." It is important to emphasize what was meant by "mens rea" in this context. The
term did not have the technical meaning, in terms of elements of the offense, that it has today. Rather, it referred to a general notion of
blameworthiness. To the common-law mind, the insanity criteria were
designed to identify persons who were not capable of making blameworthy choices. Thus, it is emphatically not the case that the "mens rea"
approach prevailed at common law; not, at least, if "mens rea" is
understood to have the technical meaning it now has. To the contrary,
an independent defense of insanity (independent of the elements of the
crime) is deeply rooted in the historical tradition of the common law.
A third line of argument made by some critics of the insanity defense
relates to the role of expert testimony in the administration of the defense.
It is argued that the slippery judgments that we know are difficult to
make are being handed over to the clinicians who ought not be making
them, and that the adjudication of insanity claims inevitably deteriorates
into a battle of experts. In essence, this argument against the insanity
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defense is an argument against expert testimony and against psychiatry.
(I should add that Professor Morris does not object to the defense on
this ground.) As I have already emphasized, the underlying question in
an insanity case is a moral one, not a clinical one, and if there are problems in the administration of the defense, in my judgment they can be
remedied by improving the quality of forensic evaluations, and by restricting the scope of expert testimony, and so on.
Another line of argument calls attention to the slippery slope. Professor Morris has indicated that he does not want to give special exculpatory significance to mental illness. Moreover, he does not want
special rules but wants to treat the mentally ill like everyone else. It is
my position that the mentally ill are different, that psychotic persons
are not like everyone else, and, therefore, that it is appropriate to have
a special rule. To this Professor Morris responds that if you open the
door to an exculpatory doctrine for mental illness, how can you justify
closing it on others who in some sense lack free will or whose capacity
to make blameworthy choices is in some sense compromised? I commented earlier on one dimension of this line of argument-the alleged
equivalence between mental illness and social adversity.
Professor Morris has also asked whether it is possible to defend a moral
distinction between mental illness and religious or political fanaticism.
This is a much more troublesome problem and one that merits further
discussion-even though we are only focusing on a corner of the canvas. Consider, for example, the fundamentalist Christian who believes
with great stridency and intensity that abortion is wrong, and constitutes
murder in the eyes of God, and that every good Christian has a moral
duty to take preventive action. To take the example a step further, assume
a particular person believes that God has revealed His will directly to
him or her, and is lead by this divine inspiration to bomb an abortion
clinic in order to stop the carnage. Should compulsion of conscience,
or the intensity of one's beliefs have exculpatory significance? The answer,
I believe, must be "no;" recognition of such a defense would make mishmash of the criminal law, opening the door to exculpation based on passionate religious or political beliefs. I would concede, however, that in
some cases it is difficult to draw the moral line between a passionately
held, aberrant, and indeed irrational belief derived from religious or
political premises, and a delusion symptomatic of mental illness. The
slope does indeed become slippery at that point, but I believe that mental illness provides a defensible moral foothold.
The final line of argument raised in our earlier discussion is that the
administration of the insanity defense involves an unacceptable risk of
fabrication and of mistake and, as Professor Morris would emphasize,
of ad hoc decisionmaking. He likens the administration of the insanity
defense to a lottery. I would concede that the 1,500 defendants acquitted by reason of insanity in any given year across the country very well
may not be the 1,500 defendants least deserving of punishment, but moral
unevenness is characteristic of the administration of criminal justice as
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a whole. The argument that we should abandon the effort to get it right,
on the grounds that we will sometimes get it wrong, or that the decisions will appear to be arbitrary in the aggregate, is an argument with
no boundaries. It is essentially an argument that the content of the penal
law does not matter. The outcome in all criminal cases too often depends
upon the wisdom and skill of counsel, and the success of insanity claims
too often depends upon the competence of the clinicians who conduct
forensic evaluations and, ultimately, upon their persuasive skills.
The system does indeed have many of the characteristics of a lottery.
However, those imperfections should not dissuade us from aiming for
moral coherence in the substantive content and shape of the penal law.
We ought to try to get it right. We ought to try to design a system which
draws the right moral lines. Criteria should be formulated so as to identify the range of cases for which exculpation seems morally appropriate
while minimizing the risk that the defense will be invoked successfully
in cases for which it is not morally appropriate. That is the challenge.
The mens rea approach fails. It surely would reduce the risk of morally
mistaken acquittals, but it also requires what I believe to be morally
mistaken convictions. A person should be exculpated if the trier of fact
determines that the person was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his or her behavior at the time of the offense as a result of mental
disease. While I recognize that this formula involves a marginal risk of
mistake, its virtue is that it preserves the jury's prerogative to bring its
moral judgment to bear on the few cases that matter.
CLOSING STATEMENT:

PROFESSOR MORRIS

First I must say that in many things I work in, I often find myself more
emotionally attuned to those whom I oppose than to my "allies." I agree
with most of what Professor Bonnie offers, and I find distasteful in the
extreme many of the reasons people give for abolishing the special defense
of insanity. That was the symbolic point I was going to come to.
Think of the bomb in the abortion clinic, or the bomb in the Beirut
barracks. I think one must yield as a moral matter that those acts are
indistinguishable from criminal acts committed by the psychotic. Though
I assume that if St. Peter does the judging he will treat those three cases
roughly as equals in moral terms, it is pretty clear that a criminal law
system cannot do that. I think most people view the conscientious, civilly
disobedient objector, as represented by Martin Luther King's "Letter from
Birmingham Jail," as about as morally innocent as you can get. But King
did recognize the need for the criminal law that convicted him. I guess
it is along that line of analysis that my pattern of thought flows differently
from that of Professor Bonnie. I believe that human processes are modest
in their capacity to make these moral distinctions. It is significant that
for more than a century and a half there has been a failure to achieve
anything resembling a consensus on the scope of the defense of insanity.
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Through my work for the state, I am involved in the building of prisons
in mental hospitals in Illinois. But I dislike it. I would prefer building
and improving psychiatric facilities in prisons. That seems more sensible to me.
I want to say just a word or two more about my submission that serious
social adversity is as morally relevant, and as equally impacting on
freedom of choice, as mental illness. A system of criminal law cannot
accept a simple deterministic world. You cannot create a criminal justice
system without making assumptions of some free will. How would you
test the extreme cases involving necessary departures from those assumptions? I submit that you would not do it by moral intuition; but, rather,
by observation, counting, and measuring. That is how I would do it.
I certainly would not trust St. Peter's intuition because he may think
other people are like himself, and they may not be. I would want to count,
and if I counted, I would surely find that the freedom of choice to be
criminal or not criminal is clearly more influenced by social adversity
than by mental illness. But we have not given an exculpatory effect to
social adversities, criminogenic though they may be, nor should we.
The same is true of mental illness. If we unpack the reality of things
from the tyranny of words, as St. Augustine said, we find this: Mental
illness should preclude guilt if it disproves either the actus reus or the
mens rea of crime; otherwise it should be relevant only to the appropriate
treatment of the convicted criminal. To make a special exception for impairments of the mind, as being peculiarly determinative of human
behavior, is a classificatory error from which even-handed justice is
unlikely to flow.

